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Central Counterparties

E-BookEPUB2 - DRM Adobe / EPUBE-Book
328 Seiten
Englisch
John Wiley & Sonserschienen am25.06.20141. Auflage
The Global Financial Crisis, from 2007 onwards, illustrated the inherent weaknesses in the global financial system and some of their causes. In particular over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were blamed by many for partially causing and catalysing the crisis. Not surprisingly, this has led to dramatic action from politicians, policymakers and regulators in relation to OTC derivative markets. Two of the most important changes are the mandatory clearing of standardised OTC derivatives and the requirements for bilateral margin posting in non-standard OTC contracts. Both clearing and margining mandates will be effectively phased in from 2014 and the associated costs will be severe. These regulatory changes are therefore going to create a dramatic shift in the topology of financial markets, together with a significant reallocation of counterparty and systemic risks. Knowledge of the subject is an important consideration for all financial institutions whether they are CCP members, clear trades indirectly or find themselves subject to bilateral margin requirements.

Central Counterparties: Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements for OTC Derivatives explains the central clearing of OTC derivatives and the associated bilateral margin requirements. The book provides a historical perspective of central clearing as it developed with derivative exchanges in order to mitigate counterparty credit risk. The regulatory requirements (Dodd-Frank, EMIR, Basel III) being imposed since the global financial crisis are defined and discussed. The mechanics of central clearing are described including operational aspects, initial margin and default fund calculations, loss waterfalls and allocation methods. Client clearing is discussed, in particular giving detail on margin segregation and portability methods. An assessment is made throughout of the advantages and disadvantages of clearing and margining requirements, including potential issues such as funding liquidity risk, operational risk and wrong-way risk.

The book is unique and covers the regulatory requirements together with the practical implementation details and the potential impacts and consequences. It is an invaluable and complete reference guide for any market practitioner, policy maker, academic or student with responsibility or interest in the area of OTC derivatives.



DR JON GREGORY is a partner at Solum Financial Partners LLP and specialises in counterparty risk and CVA related consulting and advisory projects. He has worked on many aspects of credit risk in his career, being previously with Barclays Capital, BNP Paribas and Citigroup. He is author of the book Counterparty Credit Risk and Credit Value Adjustment: A Continuing Challenge for Global Financial Markets Second Edition. Jon holds a PhD from Cambridge University.mehr
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Produkt

KlappentextThe Global Financial Crisis, from 2007 onwards, illustrated the inherent weaknesses in the global financial system and some of their causes. In particular over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were blamed by many for partially causing and catalysing the crisis. Not surprisingly, this has led to dramatic action from politicians, policymakers and regulators in relation to OTC derivative markets. Two of the most important changes are the mandatory clearing of standardised OTC derivatives and the requirements for bilateral margin posting in non-standard OTC contracts. Both clearing and margining mandates will be effectively phased in from 2014 and the associated costs will be severe. These regulatory changes are therefore going to create a dramatic shift in the topology of financial markets, together with a significant reallocation of counterparty and systemic risks. Knowledge of the subject is an important consideration for all financial institutions whether they are CCP members, clear trades indirectly or find themselves subject to bilateral margin requirements.

Central Counterparties: Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements for OTC Derivatives explains the central clearing of OTC derivatives and the associated bilateral margin requirements. The book provides a historical perspective of central clearing as it developed with derivative exchanges in order to mitigate counterparty credit risk. The regulatory requirements (Dodd-Frank, EMIR, Basel III) being imposed since the global financial crisis are defined and discussed. The mechanics of central clearing are described including operational aspects, initial margin and default fund calculations, loss waterfalls and allocation methods. Client clearing is discussed, in particular giving detail on margin segregation and portability methods. An assessment is made throughout of the advantages and disadvantages of clearing and margining requirements, including potential issues such as funding liquidity risk, operational risk and wrong-way risk.

The book is unique and covers the regulatory requirements together with the practical implementation details and the potential impacts and consequences. It is an invaluable and complete reference guide for any market practitioner, policy maker, academic or student with responsibility or interest in the area of OTC derivatives.



DR JON GREGORY is a partner at Solum Financial Partners LLP and specialises in counterparty risk and CVA related consulting and advisory projects. He has worked on many aspects of credit risk in his career, being previously with Barclays Capital, BNP Paribas and Citigroup. He is author of the book Counterparty Credit Risk and Credit Value Adjustment: A Continuing Challenge for Global Financial Markets Second Edition. Jon holds a PhD from Cambridge University.
Details
Weitere ISBN/GTIN9781118891582
ProduktartE-Book
EinbandartE-Book
FormatEPUB
Format Hinweis2 - DRM Adobe / EPUB
FormatFormat mit automatischem Seitenumbruch (reflowable)
Erscheinungsjahr2014
Erscheinungsdatum25.06.2014
Auflage1. Auflage
ReiheWiley Finance
Seiten328 Seiten
SpracheEnglisch
Dateigrösse4469 Kbytes
Artikel-Nr.3111976
Rubriken
Genre9201

Inhalt/Kritik

Leseprobe
Chapter 1
Introduction


What we know about the global financial crisis is that we don't know very much.

Paul Samuelson (19152009)

1.1 THE CRISIS

In 2007, a US housing crisis led to a credit crisis, which caused the failures of large financial institutions and a severe economic downturn. The aftermath of the global financial crisis' (GFC) is still being felt across the general economy, and has led to significant changes in the functioning of financial markets and the way in which financial institutions are regulated. The GFC highlighted the importance of controlling risk in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives to maintain global financial stability. Whilst OTC derivatives did not cause the GFC, they likely contributed to amplifying various problems and provided channels for systemic risk to propagate.

A derivative trade is a contractual relationship that may be in force from a few days to several decades. During the lifetime of the contract, the two counterparties have claims against each other such as in the form of cashflows that evolve as a function of underlying assets and market conditions. Derivatives transactions create counterparty credit risk (counterparty risk) due to the risk of insolvency of one party. This counterparty risk in turn creates systemic risk due to derivatives trading volume being dominated by a relatively small number of large derivatives counterparties (dealers') that are then key nodes of the financial system. Counterparty risk refers to the possibility that a counterparty may not meet its contractual requirements under the contract when they become due. Counterparty risk is managed over time through clearing: this can be performed bilaterally, where each counterparty manages the risk of the other, or centrally through a central counterparty (CCP). Historically, bilateral clearing is far more dominant for OTC derivatives.

During the GFC, authorities had to make key decisions over large failing financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, the Royal Bank of Scotland and AIG. These decisions were made with a very opaque view of the situation the firms were in and the potential knock-on impact of any choices made. One of the reasons for the opacity was the large volume of bilateral OTC derivatives contracts on the balance sheets of such large financial institutions. Bilateral OTC derivatives are essentially private contracts that may be illiquid and have non-standard or exotic features. A key concern over the global OTC derivatives market has always been systemic risk, which in this context refers to financial system instability exacerbated by the distress of financial institutions. In the context of the GFC, systemic risk arose due to the failure of large financial institutions and the resulting domino effects.

Bilateral OTC derivatives were clearly in the eye of the financial storm from 2007 onwards, and the creditworthiness of financial institutions and counterparty risks between them clearly contributed to the ongoing crisis. The large web of OTC derivatives positions between banks and other financial institutions suddenly became a major issue as the creditworthiness of such institutions worsened. For example, American International Group (AIG) exploited its strong credit rating to sell protection via credit default swaps (CDS). When AIG could not post additional collateral (referred to hereafter as margin') and was required to provide funds to counterparties in the face of deteriorating reference obligations in the CDS, the US government bailed them out. Politicians and regulators were concerned that default of AIG would ripple through the counterparty chains and create a systemic crisis. This led to the view that counterparty risk and the interconnectedness of large financial institutions was a channel of contagion that could amplify and transmit financial shocks.

One particular problem in relation to counterparty risk in OTC derivatives is the close out process. When a party to a contract defaults, their counterparties typically need to terminate and replace the underlying trades. In the aftermath of a large default, the OTC derivative replacement process can be associated with market illiquidity and large volatility of prices during a scramble to replace trades. Such problems were clearly illustrated in the Lehman bankruptcy and are a key reason behind some financial institutions being too big to fail'.

In contrast to OTC derivatives, the derivatives market that was cleared via central counterparties (CCPs) or clearinghouses' was much more stable during the GFC. CCPs such as LCH.Clearnet coped well with the Lehman bankruptcy when virtually every other element of the OTC derivative market was creaking or failing. One of the reasons for this is that, unlike most market participants, they had actually envisaged and prepared for such a situation. Hence, whilst CCPs still experienced problems (such as identifying the positions of Lehman's clients), they were able, with help from their members, to transfer or close out a large volume of Lehman derivatives positions without major issues. Indeed, within a week of Lehman's bankruptcy most of their outstanding OTC-cleared positions had been hedged, and within another week most of their client accounts had been transferred. Centrally cleared OTC derivatives were seemingly much safer than their bilateral equivalents.
1.2 THE MOVE TOWARDS CENTRAL CLEARING

In the aftermath of the GFC, policymakers (not surprisingly) embarked on regulatory changes that seemed largely aimed at moving risk away from global banks, and the dangerous bilateral OTC derivatives market. This seemed to be driven generally by the view that the size, opacity and interconnectedness of the market were too significant. One aspect of these policy changes were greater bank capital requirements for OTC derivatives, hardly surprising given the seemingly high leverages and accordingly low capital bases of stricken banks. Another aspect was in relation to mandatory central clearing for certain products, with CCPs seemingly emerging as a panacea for financial markets' stability. For example:


How do we establish good regulatory structure without destroying the incentive to innovate, without destroying the marketplace? We agree that we need to improve our regulations and to ensure that markets, firms, and financial products are subject to proper regulation and oversight. For example, credit default swaps financial products that ensure against potential losses should be processed through centralized clearinghouses.

George Bush, 15 November 2008.


As a part of financial reform, important legislative changes with respect to the OTC derivatives market were introduced. In September 2009, G20 leaders agreed that all standardised OTC derivatives would, in the future, need to be cleared through CCPs. This was done with the belief that a CCP can reduce systemic risk, operational risks, market manipulation and fraud, and contribute to overall market stability. It is interesting to note that the original push towards central clearing seemed to be much lighter. The G20 meeting in 2008 defined a regulatory goal to be:


Strengthening the resilience and transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, including by improving the infrastructure of over-the-counter markets

G20 declaration, Washington, November 2008


Less than a year later, the clearing mandate was clear and the focus on credit derivatives had expanded greatly to cover potentially all OTC derivatives:


All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements. We ask the FSB [Financial Stability Board] and its relevant members to assess regularly implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse.

G20 declaration, Pittsburg, September 2009


The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act enacted in July 2010, and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) proposed in September 2010 were legislative responses to this call for a new regulation of OTC derivatives markets. Key parts of both DoddFrank and EMIR were formal legislative proposals that all standardised OTC derivatives should be cleared through CCPs.

In the period since the G20 agreement on mandatory clearing, the scale and complexity of the task has gradually emerged. The requirement to clear a large fraction of OTC derivatives that are more complex and illiquid than existing cleared products is far from trivial. Furthermore, the number and variety of OTC derivative users represents a massive challenge for CCPs, who will have to develop the capability to clear new OTC derivatives and develop their offerings in the area of client clearing (where CCP clearing members' clear trades on behalf of clients). The case of client clearing gives rise to many important questions such as where the risk lies in the CCPclearing memberclient chain. Additional problems arise around the possible fragmentation of regulatory regimes globally, leading to potential arbitrages. Questions have also been raised regarding the systemic and operational risks represented by a large OTC CCP'. CCPs may also need to develop linkages with each other to be...
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