I: Introduction.- 1. The Point of Departure.- 1.1. The Routine Cases and the Hard Cases.- 1.2. The Dilemma of the Decision-Maker.- 1.3. On the Responsibility to Justify the Decisions.- 1.4. Legalism Contra Anti-Legalism.- 2. A Scientific Approach to the Contents of Legal Norms.- 2.1. The Scholar and the Judge.- 2.2. Legal Dogmatics and Social Sciences.- 2.3. Legal Dogmatics and Legal Practice.- 2.3.1. Normal Legal Practice.- 2.3.2. Judicial Practice.- 3. The Concept of Legal Dogmatics - A More Precise Formulation.- 4. The Angle of Approach and the Basic Problems.- II: The Ontology of Law.- 1. General Remarks.- 2. The Ontology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics.- 3. The Validity of a Legal Norm.- 3.1. Wróblewski's Three Approaches.- 3.2. Systematic Validity.- 3.3. The Efficacy of Legal Norms.- 3.4. The Acceptability of a Legal Norm.- III: The Methodology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics.- 1. Basic Concepts.- 1.1. Two Research Strategies.- 1.2. A Norm Statement and an Interpretative Statement.- 1.2.1. The Concept of the Norm Statement.- 1.2.2. Conclusion.- 1.2.3. A Meaning Statement and an Interpretation Statement.- 1.2.4. A Norm Standpoint and an Interpretation Standpoint.- 1.2.5. Summary.- 1.3. The Concept of the Norm.- 2. A General Characterization of Interpretation and Interpretation Theory.- 2.1. Interpretation as a Hermeneutic Process.- 2.2. The Special Nature of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics.- 3. The Sources of Law and the Directives of Legal Interpretation.- 3.1. On the Concept of the Sources of Law.- 3.1.1. The Source of Information.- 3.1.2. The Source of Reasoning.- 3.2. The List of the Sources of Law.- 3.2.1. The Finnish Catalogue of the Sources.- 3.2.2. General Remarks.- 3.3. The Categorization of the Sources of Law.- 3.3.1. The Bindingness of the Sources of Law.- 3.3.2. Authoritative Reasons and Substantial Reasons.- 3.4. Directives of Legal Interpretation.- 3.4.1. The Order of Preference of the Sources of Law.- 3.4.2. The Standards of the Reasoning Procedure.- 4. Justification of the Interpretative Standpoint: Structural Analysis.- 4.1. The Point of Departure: Disagreement on the Result of the Interpretation.- 4.2. The Scope for Interpretation: Gaps and Conflicts in the Legal Order.- 4.3. The Procedure of Discourse.- 4.4. Internal and External Justification.- 4.5. The Structure of the Ex-Justification Procedure.- 4.6. An Example of the Justification Procedure.- 4.6.1. Travaux Préparatoires.- 4.6.2. Systemic Interpretation.- 4.6.3. Court Decisions as Reasons.- 4.6.4. On the Doctrinal Opinion.- 4.6.5. Practical Reasons.- 4.6.6. Summary.- 4.7. The Relation Between the Systematization and the Interpretation of Legal Norms.- 4.7.1. The Concept of Systematization.- 4.7.2. An Example of Systematization: An Analysis of the Position of the Heir.- IV: The Acceptability of an Interpretative Statement.- 1. The Principle of the One Right Answer.- 1.1. A Terminological Clarification.- 1.2. Examples of the Doctrines of the One Right Answer.- 1.2.1. Ronald Dworkin's Theory.- 1.2.2. Norm Statements as Norm Propositions.- 1.2.2.1. Norm Statements as Predictions.- 1.2.2.1.1. The Specific Nature of Legal Predictions.- 1.2.2.1.2. On the Alf Ross' Predictive Theory.- 1.2.2.2. Ilkka Niiniluoto's Approach.- 1.2.2.3. Norm Propositions as Technical Norms.- 1.2.2.3.1 General Remarks.- 1.2.2.3.2 Secondary Technical Norms.- 1.2.2.3.3 Primary Technical Norms.- 2. Acceptability and Rationality.- 2.1. The General Preconditions of the Justification of an Interpretative Standpoint.- 2.2 The Concept of Rational Acceptability.- 2.3 Why Be Rational?.- 2.4 The General Conditions of Rational Discourse.- 2.4.1 The Point of Departure.- 2.4.2 The Basic Principles and Rules of D-Rationality.- 2.4.2.1. Consistency-Rules.- 2.4.2.2. Efficiency-Rules.- 2.4.2.3. Sincerity-Rules.- 2.4.2.4. Generalization-Rules.- 2.4.2.5. Support-Rules.- 2.4.3. The Rules of the Burden of Proof.- 2.4.3.1. Procedural Rules of the Burden of Proof.- 2.4.3.2. Material Rules of the Burden of Proof.- 2.4.4 Summary.- 2.5. Interpretations and Evaluations.- 2.6. Knowledge, Certainty and Form of Life.- 2.7. The Audience and the Form of Life.- 2.7.1. Perelman's Theory of the Audience.- 2.7.2. Some Clarifications.- 2.7.2.1. The Concrete Audience.- 2.7.2.2. The Ideal Audience.- 2.7.3. Rational Acceptability as a Regulative Principle for Legal Dogmatics.- Epilogue.- Notes.- Abbreviations.mehr

Schlagworte

VLB Haupt-Lesemotiv

Verstehen (10)

Bitte warten - die Druckansicht der Seite wird vorbereitet.

The Rational as Reasonable

Verfügbare Formate

Produkt

Inhalt/Kritik

Schlagworte

Autor

Zum Fortschritt von Theorie und Technik in Recht und Ethik / On the Advancement of Theory and Technique in Law and Ethics.

Essays on the Doctrinal Study of Law

Wegen Recht und Billigkeit.

New Approaches and Ways of Legal Thinking Revised.

Zum Fortschritt von Theorie und Technik in Recht und Ethik / On the Advancement of Theory and Technique in Law and Ethic

Services

Infos

Über uns

Leistungen

Newsletter

Zahlung