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Critical Phenomenology

E-BookEPUB2 - DRM Adobe / EPUBE-Book
240 Seiten
Englisch
John Wiley & Sonserschienen am11.10.20221. Auflage
Phenomenology is one of the leading movements in twentieth-century philosophy and continues to exert a strong influence on many contemporary philosophical traditions and investigations. In recent years, phenomenological insights have been increasingly developed in relation to philosophy of illness, disability, race, gender, sexuality, and politics, leading to the emergence of critical phenomenology as a new, prominent field for interdisciplinary research.

Magrì and McQueen's Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction is the first book of its kind, addressing the critical questions at the core of both classical and contemporary phenomenology. This book provides a concise, accessible introduction to key areas of phenomenological research, such as intersubjectivity, bodily experience, race, gender, social experience, and political action. In doing so, it demonstrates both the rich history of phenomenology and its continuing philosophical and ethical importance.

This textbook will be essential reading for undergraduate philosophy students and academics interested in critical phenomenology.


Elisa Magrì is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston College.
Paddy McQueen is Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at Swansea University.mehr
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BuchKartoniert, Paperback
EUR23,00
BuchGebunden
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E-BookEPUB2 - DRM Adobe / EPUBE-Book
EUR18,99

Produkt

KlappentextPhenomenology is one of the leading movements in twentieth-century philosophy and continues to exert a strong influence on many contemporary philosophical traditions and investigations. In recent years, phenomenological insights have been increasingly developed in relation to philosophy of illness, disability, race, gender, sexuality, and politics, leading to the emergence of critical phenomenology as a new, prominent field for interdisciplinary research.

Magrì and McQueen's Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction is the first book of its kind, addressing the critical questions at the core of both classical and contemporary phenomenology. This book provides a concise, accessible introduction to key areas of phenomenological research, such as intersubjectivity, bodily experience, race, gender, social experience, and political action. In doing so, it demonstrates both the rich history of phenomenology and its continuing philosophical and ethical importance.

This textbook will be essential reading for undergraduate philosophy students and academics interested in critical phenomenology.


Elisa Magrì is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston College.
Paddy McQueen is Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at Swansea University.
Details
Weitere ISBN/GTIN9781509541133
ProduktartE-Book
EinbandartE-Book
FormatEPUB
Format Hinweis2 - DRM Adobe / EPUB
FormatFormat mit automatischem Seitenumbruch (reflowable)
Erscheinungsjahr2022
Erscheinungsdatum11.10.2022
Auflage1. Auflage
Seiten240 Seiten
SpracheEnglisch
Dateigrösse559 Kbytes
Artikel-Nr.9961431
Rubriken
Genre9201

Inhalt/Kritik

Inhaltsverzeichnis
Introduction

1 What is Critical Phenomenology?
2 Corporeality
3 Intersubjectivity
4 Gender and Sexuality
5 Race
6 Political Experience and Political Action

Notes
References
Indexmehr
Leseprobe

1
What is Critical Phenomenology?

Between an objective history of philosophy (which would rob the great philosophers of what they have given others to think about) and a meditation disguised as a dialogue (in which we would ask the questions and give the answers) there must be a middle-ground in which the philosopher we are speaking about and the philosopher who is speaking are present together, although it is not possible even in principle to decide at any given moment just what belongs to each.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Philosopher and his Shadow

The promise of interdisciplinary scholarship is that the failure to return texts to their histories will do something. [â¦] We must remember that to not return still requires the act of following, we have to go with something if we are to depart from that thing.

Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology

In his 1945 Preface to the Phenomenology of Perception, in raising the question that was destined to plague generations of philosophers, namely What is phenomenology? , Merleau-Ponty argues that it would be impossible to reduce phenomenology to a simple label. The difficulty at stake concerns not just the characteristic diversity and richness of the phenomenological tradition, but also the methodological issues posited by the founder of the phenomenological tradition, Edmund Husserl. It was Husserl, on Merleau-Ponty s view, who conceived of phenomenology as the study of essences , namely, of the invariant structures of experience. Yet it was also Husserl who established a method of inquiry that goes beyond the mere description of essences in order to tackle the embodied and situated character of subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. xx). To understand what Merleau-Ponty means by this, it is essential to note that Husserl s phenomenology is a systematic study of both our natural (or pre-philosophical) experience of the world as well as an attempt to achieve a phenomenological stance concerned with objectivity and truth. Such a stance allows the philosopher to think about the fundamental correlations that exist between self and world as well as about the essences of objects.

Building systematically on Brentano s breakthrough, Husserl was originally concerned with the project of a descriptive psychology that would identify the main forms and structures of that being directed to an object that is distinctive of consciousness. This is what Brentano called intentionality . Thus, discourse about intentionality, intentional life, or intentional acts should not be confused with intention (the purpose we have in mind when we carry out actions). Intentionality is instead the most fundamental fact explored by phenomenology. Husserl gave to such inquiry the distinctive character of a rigorous science that deals with objects from the viewpoint of our experiential access to them, investigating only what belongs to the subject s experience, without imposing or adding any external assumptions to the phenomenon under investigation. In this way, he sought to secure phenomenology on a scientific footing. This amounts to establishing a method of analysis that is not influenced by metaphysical or scientific presuppositions, such as the Kantian distinction between phenomena and things in themselves, or the naturalistic belief that experiences make sense only as correlates of the brain s activity.

With the publication of the first book of Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (also known as Ideas I), Husserl characterized phenomenology as a transcendental investigation of essences. On this view, phenomenology seeks to describe the essential and invariant structures underlying the experience of everyday life, spanning perceptions, feelings, and judgements, but also hallucinations and imagining. In all such cases, we are typically directed to an object (whether real or imaginary) that we grasp according to a certain manner of givenness , be it in intuiting, perceiving, imagining, remembering, or thinking about something. Guiding questions include: What makes imagining different from perceiving? How does remembering represent the content experienced in the past? In what ways are intentional acts founded (or based) upon perception? Answering such questions leads to an investigation of the essential structures of intentionality, including the a priori rules and conditions that are intrinsic to our apprehension of objects.

In line with Husserl s famous motto of going back to the things themselves (Husserl 2001b, p. 168), subjective experiences are not to be thought of as lacking in objective reality just because they are subject-dependent. On the contrary, phenomena are conceived by Husserl as having a characteristic intentional structure based on how the object of experience presents itself to the self. This can be illustrated using the following example. Suppose that we look at the tree outside the window. On Husserl s view, it is possible to distinguish between three essential components underlying the meaning constituted in a given experience: the act of perception, the content of perception (the sense or meaning of the object), and the object (the actual tree in the garden). The sense of the object and the act by means of which the object is intended (in this case through perceiving) are called in the first book of Ideas noema (pl. noemata ) and noesis respectively (hence noematic-noetic analysis).1

The object perceived, the actual tree that exists independently of our experience of it, can be quite different from the tree that is grasped in the manner of perception (this because we may, for example, be hallucinating or having vivid dreams). In this respect, the intentional content of an act is not caused by the actual existence of its object.2 At the same time, intentionality reveals an intrinsic relational character, which is the relation between the tree, as the bearer of our perceptual experience, and the manner of perceiving it. As experience occurs in a temporal stream that is spatially situated, such a relation is also dynamic: for example, the tree presents itself in different profiles or manners of appearances that refer to the perspective and bodily orientation of the perceiver. While the tree remains the same and exists without being perceived, the perception of the tree outside my window is a perception that is constantly changing: the tree appears now white under the snow, but it also presents itself in different profiles and shades as I move and look at it from various angles. Thus, the tree is perceived against the background of a manifold of different noemata or presentations, which are motivated by the different bodily activities that take place in perceiving. Ultimately, the tree existing outside the window is thematized as a being for a consciousness (hence, it is neither caused by consciousness nor included in consciousness).

To uncover the temporal, logical, and sense-bestowing nexuses involved in each stream of experience, it is necessary, on Husserl s view, to adopt a phenomenological method through which the philosopher temporarily brackets or suspends metaphysical or scientific presuppositions about the matter at hand in order to attend to what is immanent or intrinsic to a given experiential phenomenon. In this sense, the task of phenomenology is to describe the content of experience as this is given to consciousness. Such a task also requires the suspension of the natural attitude in which we always live in everyday life. The natural attitude is a form of orientation in the surrounding world (Umwelt), which is constantly changing with respect to the self, as the world we inhabit is not just a world of objects but also a world of values and goods (Husserl 2004, p. 50). As Husserl writes in Ideas I, we live in a world of things on hand , namely things that are practically relevant, and we do not encounter human beings and animals as things , but rather as friends, foes, and relatives (Husserl 2004, pp. 49-50). Thus, suspending the natural attitude does not mean turning away from the world and our interaction with it. At stake is, rather, the attempt to identify and illustrate the intentional structures that make the relation between self and the world intelligible and relevant.

The analysis of the essential structures and variations that occur in the relation between consciousness and its intentional objects informs a large part of Husserl s concern with issues of meaning, essence, and truth. In this context, to speak of essences (or eidÄ, from the Ancient Greek forms , hence eidetic analysis ) means to grasp the identity of an intentional object across the manifold of its presentations within a given domain, whether this is the domain of concepts (such as, the empirical concept of tree ) or the ontological domains of nature and subjectivity (which involve physical and psychophysical beings). Transcendental phenomenology ultimately reveals that we are not only psychological or empirical subjects in the world, but also, and at the same time, transcendental subjects for the world. Indeed, the fundamental meaning-structures of intentionality disclosed by phenomenological analysis are universally shared by different psychophysical subjects without thereby overriding their empirical,...
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