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Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents

BuchGebunden
192 Seiten
Englisch
Oxford University Presserschienen am27.06.2024
Jessica Brown examines groups both as epistemic and as moral agents, offering original accounts of group evidence, group belief, group justified belief, group knowledge, what it is for a group to act or believe for one reason rather than another, and when a group has an excuse for wrongdoing from blameless ignorance.mehr
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BuchGebunden
EUR95,50
E-BookPDFDRM AdobeE-Book
EUR78,99
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Produkt

KlappentextJessica Brown examines groups both as epistemic and as moral agents, offering original accounts of group evidence, group belief, group justified belief, group knowledge, what it is for a group to act or believe for one reason rather than another, and when a group has an excuse for wrongdoing from blameless ignorance.
Details
ISBN/GTIN978-0-19-889807-8
ProduktartBuch
EinbandartGebunden
FormatGenäht
Erscheinungsjahr2024
Erscheinungsdatum27.06.2024
Seiten192 Seiten
SpracheEnglisch
MasseBreite 142 mm, Höhe 223 mm, Dicke 16 mm
Gewicht340 g
Artikel-Nr.61430950

Inhalt/Kritik

Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface1: A package of views2: Group evidence3: Group belief for a reason4: Group belief5: Group justified belief and knowledge6: Group action for a reason7: Group excuse from blameless ignoranceConclusionmehr

Autor

Jessica Brown is professor of philosophy in the Arché research centre at St Andrews University. Since her Ph.D. at Oxford University, she has worked on a wide range of topics within philosophy of mind, epistemology, the methodology of philosophy, and responsibility. She has published two monographs (Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, MIT 2004; and Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, OUP 2018). In addition, she has co-edited several collections for Oxford University Press (Defeat, Reasons and Justification, 2022; Knowledge Ascriptions, 2012; and Assertion, 2011).