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Science: Conjectures and Refutations / Wissenschaft: Vermutungen und Widerlegungen (Englisch/Deutsch)

von
Popper, Karl RaimundBeisbart, ClausHrsg.Albert, GretlÜbersetzungMew, MelittaÜbersetzungPopper, Karl R.ÜbersetzungSchiffer, EvaÜbersetzungSiebeck, GeorgÜbersetzung
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Reclam Verlagerschienen am13.05.20221. Auflage
Was unterscheidet wissenschaftliche Hypothesen von pseudowissenschaftlichen Theorien? Und wie geht die wissenschaftliche Forschung vor? Kaum jemand hat die philosophische Diskussion über diese Fragen so stark geprägt wie Popper. Im vorliegenden klassischen Aufsatz fasst er die Entwicklung seiner Beiträge zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie zusammen. Der Band enthält den Text im englischen Original und in der deutschen, von Popper durchgesehenen Standard-Übersetzung sowie einen ausführlichen Kommentar, der den Argumentationsgang und die Wirkung des Textes bis heute nachzeichnet. Die Reihe »Great Papers Philosophie« bietet bahnbrechende Aufsätze der Philosophie: - Eine zeichengenaue, zitierfähige Wiedergabe des Textes (links das fremdsprachige Original, rechts eine neue Übersetzung). - Eine philosophiegeschichtliche Einordnung: Wie dachte man früher über das Problem? Welche Veränderung bewirkte der Aufsatz? Wie denkt man heute darüber? - Eine Analyse des Textes bzw. eine Rekonstruktion seiner Argumentationsstruktur, gefolgt von einem Abschnitt über den Autor sowie ein kommentiertes Literaturverzeichnis. E-Book mit Seitenzählung der Originalpaginierung.

Der Herausgeber: Claus Beisbart, Extraordinarius mit Schwerpunkt Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Geschäftsführender Direktor des Instituts für Philosophie an der Universität Bern.mehr
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KlappentextWas unterscheidet wissenschaftliche Hypothesen von pseudowissenschaftlichen Theorien? Und wie geht die wissenschaftliche Forschung vor? Kaum jemand hat die philosophische Diskussion über diese Fragen so stark geprägt wie Popper. Im vorliegenden klassischen Aufsatz fasst er die Entwicklung seiner Beiträge zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie zusammen. Der Band enthält den Text im englischen Original und in der deutschen, von Popper durchgesehenen Standard-Übersetzung sowie einen ausführlichen Kommentar, der den Argumentationsgang und die Wirkung des Textes bis heute nachzeichnet. Die Reihe »Great Papers Philosophie« bietet bahnbrechende Aufsätze der Philosophie: - Eine zeichengenaue, zitierfähige Wiedergabe des Textes (links das fremdsprachige Original, rechts eine neue Übersetzung). - Eine philosophiegeschichtliche Einordnung: Wie dachte man früher über das Problem? Welche Veränderung bewirkte der Aufsatz? Wie denkt man heute darüber? - Eine Analyse des Textes bzw. eine Rekonstruktion seiner Argumentationsstruktur, gefolgt von einem Abschnitt über den Autor sowie ein kommentiertes Literaturverzeichnis. E-Book mit Seitenzählung der Originalpaginierung.

Der Herausgeber: Claus Beisbart, Extraordinarius mit Schwerpunkt Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Geschäftsführender Direktor des Instituts für Philosophie an der Universität Bern.

Inhalt/Kritik

Inhaltsverzeichnis
Science: Conjectures and Refutations
Wissenschaft: Vermutungen und Widerlegungen

Zu dieser Ausgabe
Anmerkungen
Literaturhinweise
Kommentar
1 Einleitung
2 Die Problemlage
3 Rekonstruktion der Argumentation
4 Würdigung der Hauptergebnisse
Zur Personmehr
Leseprobe

I

WHEN I received the list of participants in this course1 and realized that I had been asked to speak to philosophical colleagues I thought, after some hesitation and consultation, that you would probably prefer me to speak about those problems which interest me most, and about those developments with which I am most intimately acquainted. I therefore decided to do what I have never done before: to give you a report on my own work in the philosophy of science, since the autumn of 1919 when I first began to grapple with the problem, When should a theory be ranked as scientific? or Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory?

[8]The problem which troubled me at the time was neither, When is a theory true? nor, When is a theory acceptable? My problem was different. I wished to distinguish between science and pseudo-science; knowing very well that science often errs, and that pseudo-science may happen to stumble on the truth.

I knew, of course, the most widely accepted answer to my problem: that science is distinguished from pseudo-science - or from metaphysics  - by its empirical method, which is essentially inductive, proceeding from observation or experiment. But this did not satisfy me. On the contrary, I often formulated my problem as one of distinguishing between a genuinely empirical method and a non-empirical or even a pseudo-empirical method - that is to say, a method which, although it appeals to observation and experiment, nevertheless [34] does not come up to scientific standards. The latter method may be exemplified by astrology, with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation - on horoscopes and on biographies.

But as it was not the example of astrology which led me to my problem I should perhaps briefly describe the atmosphere in which my problem arose and the examples by which it was stimulated. After the collapse of the Austrian [10]Empire there had been a revolution in Austria: the air was full of revolutionary slogans and ideas, and new and often wild theories. Among the theories which interested me Einstein s theory of relativity was no doubt by far the most important. Three others were Marx s theory of history, Freud s psycho-analysis, and Alfred Adler s so-called individual psychology .

There was a lot of popular nonsense talked about these theories, and especially about relativity (as still even today), but I was fortunate in those who introduced me to the study of this theory. We all - the small circle of students to which I belonged - were thrilled with the result of Eddington s eclipse observations which in 1919 brought the first important confirmation of Einstein s theory of gravitation. It was a great experience for us, and one which had a lasting influence on my intellectual development.

The three other theories I have mentioned were also widely discussed among students at that time. I myself happened to come into personal contact with Alfred Adler, and even to co-operate with him in his social work among the children and young people in the working-class districts of Vienna where he had established social guidance clinics.

It was during the summer of 1919 that I began to feel more and more dissatisfied with these three theories - the Marxist theory of history, psycho-analysis, and individual [12]psychology; and I began to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status. My problem perhaps first took the simple form, What is wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton s theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?

To make this contrast clear I should explain that few of us at the time would have said that we believed in the truth of Einstein s theory of gravitation. This shows that it was not my doubting the truth of those other three theories which bothered me, but something else. Yet neither was it that I merely felt mathematical physics to be more exact than the sociological or psychological type of theory. Thus what worried me was neither the problem of truth, at that stage at least, nor the problem of exactness or measurability. It was rather that I felt that these other three theories, though posing as sciences, had in fact more in common with primitive myths than with science; that they resembled astrology rather than astronomy.

I found that those of my friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and Adler, were impressed by a number of points common to these theories, and especially by their apparent explanatory power. These theories appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred. The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an [35] intellectual conversion [14]or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refused to see it, either because it was against their class interest, or because of their repressions which were still un-analysed and crying aloud for treatment.

The most characteristic element in this situation seemed to me the incessant stream of confirmations, of observations which verified the theories in question; and this point was constantly emphasized by their adherents. A Marxist could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for his interpretation of history; not only in the news, but also in its presentation - which revealed the class bias of the paper - and especially of course in what the paper did not say. The Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their clinical observations . As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not [16]even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. Because of my thousandfold experience, he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold.

What I had in mind was that his previous observations may not have been much sounder than this new one; that each in its turn had been interpreted in the light of previous experience , and at the same time counted as additional confirmation. What, I asked myself, did it confirm? No more that that a case could be interpreted in the light of the theory. But this meant very little, I reflected, since every conceivable case could be interpreted in the light of Adler s theory, or equally of Freud s. I may illustrate this by two very different examples of human behaviour: that of a man who pushes a child into the water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his life in an attempt to save the child. Each of these two cases can be explained with equal case in Freudian and in Adlerian terms. According to Freud the first man suffered from repression (say, of some component of his Oedipus complex), while the second man had achieved sublimation. According to Adler the first man suffered from feelings of inferiority (producing perhaps the need to prove to himself that he dared to commit some crime), and so did the second man (whose need was to prove to himself that he dared to rescue the child). I could not think of any human behaviour which [18]could not be interpreted in terms of either theory. It was precisely this fact - that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed - which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.

With Einstein s theory the situation was strikingly different. Take one [36] typical instance - Einstein s prediction, just then confirmed by the findings of Eddington s expedition. Einstein s gravitational theory had led to the result that light must be attracted by heavy bodies (such as the sun), precisely as material bodies were attracted. As a consequence it could be calculated that light from a distant fixed star whose apparent position was close to the sun would reach the earth from such a direction that the star would seem to be slightly shifted away from the sun; or, in other words, that stars close to the sun would look as if they had moved a little away from the sun, and from one another. This is a thing which cannot normally be observed since such star are rendered invisible in daytime by the sun s overwhelming brightness; but during an eclipse it is possible to take photographs of them. If the same constellation is photographed at night one can measure the distances on the two photographs, and check the predicted effect.

Now the impressive thing about this case is the risk involved in a prediction of this kind. If observation shows [20]that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory...
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