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Why States Rebel

Understanding State Sponsorship of Terrorism
BuchKartoniert, Paperback
281 Seiten
Englisch
Verlag Barbara Budricherschienen am21.03.2016
State sponsorship of terrorism connects major contemporary issues of international relations such as intra- and interstate conflict as well as third-party intervention. The author examines Syria's relations with Palestinian Fatah, Turkish-Kurdish PKK, and Lebanese Hizballah, between 1964 and 2006. In order to understand why states choose to formmehr

Produkt

KlappentextState sponsorship of terrorism connects major contemporary issues of international relations such as intra- and interstate conflict as well as third-party intervention. The author examines Syria's relations with Palestinian Fatah, Turkish-Kurdish PKK, and Lebanese Hizballah, between 1964 and 2006. In order to understand why states choose to form
Details
ISBN/GTIN978-3-8474-0641-9
ProduktartBuch
EinbandartKartoniert, Paperback
Erscheinungsjahr2016
Erscheinungsdatum21.03.2016
Reihen-Nr.2
Seiten281 Seiten
SpracheEnglisch
Gewicht412 g
Artikel-Nr.33479111
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Inhalt/Kritik

Inhaltsverzeichnis
TablesV FiguresVI AbbreviationsVII 1Introduction: Internationalizing intrastate conflict1 1.1Why states interfere - an empirical puzzle1 1.2State of research3 1.3Theoretical overview7 1.4State sponsorship of terrorism9 1.4.1Definitions9 1.4.2Pyramid or rag rug? Patterns of sponsorship revisited12 1.5Research questions17 1.6Research design18 1.7Outline of the study21 2Realist alliance theory and the quest for the optimum balance23 2.1Neorealism: A theory of foreign policy constraints24 2.1.1Foreign policy in neorealism: Sealing Pandora's (black) Box?24 2.1.2In-, not outside the box: Taking domestic politics seriously25 2.2Neoclassical realism: A theory of mistakes25 2.2.1Neoclassical realism and the state26 2.2.2Third World only? Neoclassical realism and regime vulnerability28 2.3"Whoe'er would form eternal bonds - " - Alliance formation30 2.3.1The external security dilemma31 2.3.2The domestic security dilemma32 2.3.3A simple equation? Costs and benefits of alliance formation33 2.3.3.1Tying the knot: Benefits of alliance formation33 2.3.3.2Fatal attraction: Costs of alliance formation36 2.3.4Conclusion: Alliance formation in a multifaceted security environment37 2.4" - should weigh if heart to heart responds." - Alliance management38 2.4.1The alliance security dilemma38 2.4.2How the security dilemma influences alliance management39 2.4.3Domestic politics in the alliance dilemma41 2.4.4Conclusion: Risk management in alliances42 3Realism and state sponsorship of terrorism45 3.1Informality and secrecy in alliance politics45 3.1.1Formality: From shaking hands to signing treaties46 3.1.2Publicity: Can a secret deter anyone?47 3.2When your best friend is said to be invisible: Non-state actors in alliance politics48 3.2.1Non-state actors in international politics49 3.2.2How terrorism affects national security51 3.2.3Shadow boxing? Realism and the war against terrorism53 3.3Sponsorship as a functional equivalent to interstate alliances56 3.3.1What terrorist groups need support for56 3.3.1.1Hosting58 3.3.1.2Military support58 3.3.1.3Financial support59 3.3.1.4Endorsement59 3.3.2A bird in a gilded cage: The alliance security dilemma from a terrorist perspective61 3.3.2.1Costs of sponsorship for the supported group61 3.3.2.2When terrorists fall prey to international politics62 3.3.3State sponsorship and the security dilemma63 3.3.3.1Benefits of sponsorship63 3.3.3.2Costs of sponsorship65 3.4When do states decide to sponsor?69 3.5Sponsorship and the alliance dilemma71 3.5.1Abandonment risks in sponsorship relations72 3.5.2Entrapment risks in sponsorship relations72 3.6Sponsorship and the domestic alliance dilemma74 4Research design: Assessing state sponsorship of terrorism77 4.1Independent variable: Systemic incentives for alliance behavior77 4.2Conditional variable: Domestic politics80 4.3Dependent variable: Sponsorship commitment82 4.3.1Hosting83 4.3.2Military support84 4.3.3Financial assistance85 4.3.4Endorsement85 4.4The case of Syria88 5From joint defeat to open war: Syria & Fatah93 5.1Nature of the Sponsorship Dilemma94 5.1.1Drifting apart: The power imbalance between Syria and Israel94 5.1.2Bridging the gap? Fatah/PLO's capacity as an ally96 5.1.2.1Attacks against Israel97 5.1.2.2Support base98 5.1.2.3Cohesion of command99 5.1.2.4Ability to escape or resist retaliation100 5.1.3Severity of conflict102 5.1.4Availability of alternative allies104 5.1.5Strategic interest in upholding the alignment106 5.1.6Conclusion108 5.2Domestic politics: The Struggle for Syria110 5.2.1Ties that divide: Ba'thist factionalism and the struggle for Syria 1963-1970112 5.2.2One to rule them all: Asad's consolidation of power 1970-1976118 5.2.3Conclusion122 5.3Syria's policy towards Fatah (1964-1976)124 5.3.1Hosting124 5.3.2Military support127 5.3.3Financial support131 5.3.4Endorsement132 5.3.5Conclusion136 6The outstayed welcome: Syria & the Kurdistan Workers' Party139 6.1Nature of the sponsorship dilemma140 6.1.1A clear superiority: The power imbalance between Turkey and Syria140 6.1.2Added value: The PKK's capacity as an ally143 6.1.2.1Attacks against Turkey143 6.1.2.2Support base146 6.1.2.3Cohesion of command148 6.1.2.4Ability to escape or resist retaliation150 6.1.3Severity of conflict152 6.1.4Availability of allies155 6.1.5Strategic interest in upholding the alignment157 6.1.6Conclusion160 6.2Domestic politics: Power consolidation and a looming succession crisis162 6.2.1To Hama and back again (1976-1985)164 6.2.2Constraining praetorianism: A family affair170 6.2.3Conclusion172 6.3Syria's policy towards the PKK (1978-1998)175 6.3.1Hosting175 6.3.2Military support179 6.3.3Financial support180 6.3.4Endorsement181 6.3.5Conclusion184 7A shifting balance: Syria & Hizballah187 7.1Nature of the sponsorship dilemma188 7.1.1Facing a decisive edge: the power imbalance between Syria and Israel188 7.1.2Hizballah's capacity as an ally against Israel191 7.1.2.1Attacks against Israel191 7.1.2.2Support base194 7.1.2.3Cohesion of command195 7.1.2.4Ability to escape or resist retaliation197 7.1.3Severity of conflict199 7.1.4Availability of allies202 7.1.5Strategic interest in upholding the alignment205 7.1.6Conclusion209 7.2Domestic politics: Power transition and external shocks211 7.2.1The heir apparent213 7.2.2Seasons in Damascus215 7.2.3The emergence of the triumvirate218 7.2.4Conclusion220 7.3Syria's policy towards Hizbollah (1989-2006)222 7.3.1Hosting222 7.3.2Military support225 7.3.3Financial support228 7.3.4Endorsement229 7.3.5Conclusion233 8Findings and implications239 8.1Formation of sponsorship240 8.2Patterns of sponsorship243 8.3Theoretical implications248 8.4Avenues for further research250 8.5Policy implications252 9References255mehr

Schlagworte

Autor

Dr. rer. pol. Magdalena Kirchner is a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), Berlin, Germany.Dr. rer. pol. Magdalena Kirchner is a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), Berlin, Germany.